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Committee: Special
Political Committee Topic: Security
Implications of Climate Change Author: Committee background The Special Political and
Decolonization Committee, also known as the Fourth Committee, was formed on SpecPol discusses international political issues; chief among these are those that deal with fomenting democracy and decolonization as well as topics with global repercussions. Although the committee may not authorize any military action, it has the responsibility of recommending courses of action to the UN Security Council, the Specialized Agencies, international governmental and non-governmental bodies and the individual governments of member states. Members of the SpecPol Committee must always remain highly cognizant of the fine line between the internal sovereignty of a state and an international crisis. In this session of the Special Political and Decolonization Committee, the committee has been charged with debating and creating recommendations about the security implications of climate change. It is the hope of the Secretary General that all members will work collaboratively to produce a series of policy recommendations for the GA, SC and other agencies. As this issue is truly pervasive and not confined to any one member state, your recommendations will be of more than passing interest to everyone within the international arena.[i] Statement and History
of the Problem Climate change is a process that has been affecting our planet since the Big Bang; however, it is only in recent years that the notion that man’s contribution to global warming is non-trivial has gained widespread credence. The issues surrounding climate change have been catapulted into the public consciousness of late, with films like An Inconvenient Truth entering the mainstream media. Less attention has been paid to the security implications, direct and indirect, of untrammeled climate change. While largely speculative and based almost entirely on theoretical, rather than empirical, research, the potential consequences arising from global warming need to be understood and anticipated, in order to lessen the possibly devastating impacts. Before a discussion of “security implications” may commence, we must be clear on a few notions. “Security” is a rather broad term, encompassing several distinct ideas. On the one hand there is the notion of national security, the traditional geo-political aspect of security, which deals with a nation’s foreign and military policy toward other nation states. Human security, on the other hand, deals with individual survival, paying little heed to political boundaries. The lines between these two notions often blur, however: as an illustration, consider a state suffering from a massive natural disaster (as a flood or a landslide), leading to a mass exodus from that state to a neighbouring state. This situation has multiple facets. Firstly, there is the concern for the displaced population’s welfare: where will they live? How will they eat? How will they earn a livelihood? Secondly, how does this impact the host state? Can they accommodate the influx of foreigners? How will the host and refugee populations interact? Such a large movement of people could constitute a national security threat, depending on a multitude of factors. The word “implications” must also be read with care: this paper will discuss – and this committee must deal with – potential consequences. The implications of climate change are myriad, some more certain than others, but all are probabilistic events. Nevertheless, we must attempt to obviate or otherwise minimize adverse outfalls. We must also clarify what the term “climate change” encompasses, and what the physical effects thereof are. There is widespread consensus amongst the scientific community that global average temperatures are rising, and are rising as a direct result of human activity – in particular, the burning of fossil fuels, leading to emissions of carbon dioxide as well as other greenhouse gases. While meteorology is an imprecise science, the IPCC estimates that global surface temperatures will increase between 1.1 and 6.4 degrees Celsius between 1990 and 2100. The effects of climate change, however, are not uniformly distributed: in fact, quite the opposite. Weather will become increasingly unstable and unpredictable, and climate change is likely to exacerbate existing situations. For example, while average rainfall is expected to increase, the majority of that will be in areas already experiencing a great deal of precipitation, while arid regions are likely to become even drier. As a result, longer rainy seasons will allow mosquitoes and other disease vectors to flourish, while on the other hand droughts (and floods) will be more frequent and severe. As well, global sea levels are expected to rise as icecaps melt, causing damage to coastal and low-lying regions, and severe weather phenomena (hurricanes and the like) are expected to be more frequent and severe. Glacial lakes are expected to increase in size, and avalanches to become more frequent. As a result, drinking water may increase in scarcity in some areas, crops may suffer due to lack of irrigation, economies may be disrupted, and migration patterns may change. All of these potentialities have greater implications when considered from a security perspective. For a more detailed description, as well as a continent-by-continent treatment, see the IPCC report in the web links below. In “The Security Implications of Climate Change for the UN System,” Busby and Purvis group security threats into three broad headings: violence and armed conflict; natural disasters and humanitarian crises; and destabilizing forces. The probability of violence and armed conflict increasing as a result of climate change, while minimal, cannot be ignored. The logic is as follows: as climate change alters the distribution of natural resources, competition for dwindling supplies becomes more likely. Climate change-induced natural disasters – such as avalanches or floods – could also increase the likelihood of conflict. In particular, if a government is seen as unable to unwilling to meet the needs of the citizens, in crisis situations or otherwise, it risks losing what legitimacy it has, and popular unrest or revolt becomes increasingly likely. However, these scenarios are generally viewed as less likely than the following implications. Over the past few years, the world has witnessed an alarming number of natural disasters, including tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, and avalanches. The humanitarian crises that ensue from these situations can be gargantuan: often millions of people are forced to relocate, and provisions must be made to feed, clothe, and house them temporarily. While internally displaced persons (IDPs) are a significant concern, refugees – those who flee to neighbouring countries – pose a larger security dilemma on the international stage, particularly as host and guest populations may not be completely compatible on some level. In some cases the governments of the states involved are incapable or unwilling to provide sufficient assistance, and while international relief agencies have often stepped up, allegations have been made that the relief effort is insufficiently co-ordinated between the various agencies: that overlapping efforts often neglect certain regions or people. Finally, climate change could exacerbate certain situations – drought, disease, malnutrition, lack of potable water – to the point where the state ceases to function effectively: that is, the state fails. In this case, climate change acts as a catalyst in destabilizing a region. It should be noted that these occurrences are not uniformly likely across states; in fact, some states are particularly vulnerable to the afore-mentioned security situations for a number of reasons. Among the most vulnerable are the LDCs (least-developed countries), and weak and undemocratic states. It should be noted that this puts many African and tropical states, in particular, at high risk. LDCs are so susceptible because they lack the infrastructure and resources to either prevent or adapt to climate-induced crises. Undemocratic states, whether able or not, simply lack the incentive to do so; they are not accountable to their population. Weak, failed, and failing states – those with inadequate abilities to govern – are particularly vulnerable to destabilizing forces. Case Studies: Small Island Developing States (SIDS): Small Island Developing
States, such as As island states, these nations (of which many, but not all, are sovereign states) have several common features: high coastline-to-land area ratios; high population densities; high degree of isolation; inadequate infrastructure; economic vulnerability; and restricted freshwater resources. Greater probability of cyclones, greater variability in fish, and greater contamination of freshwater resources are all issues facing these nations. The most extreme scenario is the possibility, as ocean levels and temperatures rise, that some of these nations may become entirely uninhabitable, calling into question notions of national sovereignty and leaving an entire people nationless. What is difficult here is identifying “thresholds of change”, that is, the point(s) where climate change dramatically alters the living conditions in the country. The security risks here are not as blatant as in the following situations, and while the populations involved are relatively small, the consequences of a state or a culture “disappearing” (while probabilistically unlikely) have been little explored. What is likely is increasing rates of emigration from these countries, resulting in population decline. This may lead to a decline in foreign investment, and a downward spiral commences. From the perspective of international human rights and justice, allowing some nations to collapse due to the (arguably) reckless emissions records of (predominantly) Western nations is abominable. Darfur: The present-day conflict in the Sudanese region of Darfur,
begun in February of 2003 and rooted in the earlier conflicts of the 1980s,
pits the government-backed Janjaweed militia against various rebel factions
based in The humanitarian crisis gripping
the country for the past four years has cost more than four hundred thousand
lives and resulted in two and a half million refugees, most fleeing to other
areas of The recent discovery of an underground lake (Lake Ptolemy) in northern Sudan is covered in The Economist (9 August 2007); however, while climate change is clearly implicated in the source of the conflict, it is less clear that “solving” the climate change-induced water scarcity (via Lake Ptolemy) will resolve the issue. This unique situation offers some insight into the importance of an ex-ante strategy for mitigating climate change and its effects, rather than merely an ex-post adaptive plan. Since January 2007, the country has been under emergency rule in an effort to combat the corrupt regimes of recent years. It is now in the hands of a militarily-backed “caretaker government” which promises elections in December 2007. However, the army has been accused of exploiting the flood-induced chaos to its advantage, consolidating its power in key political positions and institutions; rumours of a full military takeover abound. Human Rights Watch has accused the government not only of failing to safeguard individuals’ rights, but excesses such as arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings. While climate change is only
tenuously linked to the political situation at hand, floods and natural
disasters, made more frequent and severe through climate change, can result in
unstable situations that can exacerbate situations such as that in Past UN
(Committee etc.) Actions: Countless UN bodies have been studying
and grappling with climate change-related issues for some time, either directly
or indirectly, although few have specifically singled out the security
dimension. The Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) has been
monitoring and assessing climate change for the past few years and issues
regular assessment reports highlighting at-risk situations and updates in
significant detail. They predict a rise in global average temperatures of 1.4
degrees Celsius between 1990 and 2100. The IPCC falls under the aegis of two
other UN organs, namely, the World Meteorological Organization ( The UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) is an international (non-binding) environmental treaty
signed at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), or “Earth
Summit,” in Finally, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has focused on issues of food security, particularly as arable land becomes increasingly scarce in the developing world. Proposed Solutions: Broadly speaking, solutions fall into one of two categories: emissions mitigation, and adaptation. These solutions are outlined in greater detail in the Purvis and Busby paper. Multiple attempts have been made
to tackle the former solution, through treaties and protocols such as the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. However, success has been minimal, and some
claim that these treaties are insufficiently ambitious. Categorizations such as
Annex I and non-Annex I have become increasingly controversial, especially with
the rise of In terms of adaptation, one aspect is existing UN humanitarian and disaster relief efforts. It has been proposed that these be strengthened, in order that the international community can respond more effectively to climate change-induced crises. However, this is the “pound of cure” of the old adage; ideally the UN can strengthen systems for forecasting climate change and disaster scenarios in order to take preventative action where needed. Clearly this “ounce of prevention” is a preferred solution; however, the execution is fraught with difficulty, as the science is still so imprecise. There are already two instruments in place which attempt this, namely the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction (IATF/DR) and the Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR). However, it has been suggested that these be more generously funded, and the latter develop a deeper focus on climate change in particular; furthermore, they should be more integrated into the IPCC team of experts so as to avoid redundancy and improve efficiency. However, the more severe problems outlined above – including mass migration, armed conflict, and state failure – need more innovative solutions. Early warning systems, such as the UN Humanitarian Early Warning System, are crucial in identifying vulnerable states. Other bodies, such as the FAO and USAID, have similar early warning systems. It has been suggested that the IPCC “convene a conference that engages international security, climate, and disaster experts.” Preventative diplomacy is another avenue crucial for dealing with climate change disasters, particularly between UN officials, decision makers in vulnerable states, and NGOs. However, if such tactics become impossible to implement, the UN should be open to the use of force in extreme situations; this, however, is an extremely sensitive issue and must be dealt with quite carefully. Questions a Resolution Must Answer To what extent should a UN response focus on mitigation versus adaptive responses, especially given the current track record of mitigation attempts? How might incentives and/or public exposure be used to increase the effectiveness of such measures? Is the current distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I countries still valid? How should responsibility be weighted, given historical emissions records of various countries? In terms of adaptive measures, how effective are the current instruments for predicting and dealing with crisis scenarios? How can they be better utilized? Should they be strengthened or integrated in some way? As always, at what point should the UN intervene in national concerns? Bloc Positions: While there is general agreement
that climate change is a grave problem, perspectives on various solutions
differ widely. As industrialized nations indisputably contributed the most to
the current levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the developing world
tends to feel that they should be largely held responsible for mitigating
emissions as well as responding to climate-induced crises in the developing
world. Furthermore, they argue that the burning of fossil fuels – and the
consequent emissions – is essential to the development process, and that by
restricting emissions, their economies are being crippled; this has been
verified empirically. Among the developing world, there
is further divide of a geographical nature. As mentioned, certain states are
more vulnerable than others, and even within those, the sorts of
vulnerabilities differ. LDCs are hampered in terms of both mitigation and
adaptation by a lack of resources. SIDS suffer from a combination of
underdevelopment and unique geography, as elaborated earlier. Africa is most at
risk for drought and migratory problems, while Finally, Latin American countries face desertification – leading many to cut into their rapidly-dwindling rainforest areas in search of arable land – and salinisation of water supplies. Many of these situations are occurring today; they are no mere potentialities. The developed world also exhibits some variability. Certain states, such the Netherlands, Japan, France, Germany, and the UK have relatively low emissions – the UK, for example, has already surpassed its reduction target, and France no longer operates any coal mines, relying largely on nuclear energy. See the National Adaptation Programmes of Action for specific strategies of several countries; see also the IPCC report for continent-specific impacts of climate change. Some questions and
suggestions to guide your research: In what ways has climate change affected your country? How will it be affected in the future? What kind of contingency plans does your country have in place for dealing with potential climate change-induced disasters? In particular, to possible security risks associated therewith? How vulnerable is your country to these sorts of risks – is your country, for example, an LDC? A failed state? An undemocratic state? Consider also neighbouring states. To what extent has your country
contributed to the current levels of greenhouse gases? What provisions does
your country currently have in place, if any, to mitigate emissions? What is
your compliance record like (vis à vis Is the threat to national or to human security viewed as a greater problem by your country? To what extent are these security implications a global problem, and to what extent a national concern? Which other countries feel similarly? Web resources: a list
of links: Nigel Purvis and Joshua Busby. 2004. “The Security Implications of Climate Change for the UN System.” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/ecspr10_unf-purbus.pdf April 2007. “Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM13apr07.pdf An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario
and Its Implications for Jon Barnett. October 2001. “Security and Climate Change.” Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/wp7.pdf Jon Barnett and W. Neil Adger. October 2001. “Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries.” Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/wp9.pdf United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. http://unfccc.int/2860.php National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs). UNFCCC. http://unfccc.int/national_reports/napa/items/2719.php Nina Brenjo. Barney Porter. Rater Zonaki. Further Suggested
Bibliography: An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore. The Economist, print edition. |