Committee: Security Council
Topic: Iran's
Nuclear Program
Author: Tory Tait
History
The history
of the Iranian nuclear program starts out with the nuclear program of the US
backed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in the late fifties. In 1959 at the Tehran University,
the Tehran Nuclear Research
Center was constructed
under the orders of the Shah. This nuclear facility was run by the Atomic
Energy Association of Iran (which henceforth will be referred to as the AEAI)
and began as the primary nuclear research facility of Iran. The
program gained headway in 1960 when the United
States provided Iran with their first light water
reactor, five megawatts in size, as part of the “Atoms for Peace” program. In
hopes of discouraging the construction of nuclear weapons, the Atoms for Peace
program was an international attempt in sharing peaceful nuclear equipment and
information in exchange for the promise not to engage in the construction of
nuclear weaponry. The reactor was capable of producing only 600 grams of
plutonium per year in spent fuel; and it was in line with current International
Atomic Energy Agency standards. However, the Shah, given to ostentations
expenditure was determined that he wanted a much more ambitious nuclear program
after a visit to the United
States in 1964.
In keeping
with the peaceful progression of the Iranian nuclear program at the time, Iran signed the
non-proliferation treaty in 1968, and the treaty was ratified in 1970. The
non-proliferation treaty or NPT is a multilateral international treaty
supporting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and discouraging nuclear arms
proliferation. In the pursuit of his ambitious nuclear program the Shah signed
a contract with Kraftwerk Union, a subsidiary of the West German company Siemens,
to build two large 1,200 megawatt nuclear reactors at the nuclear power station
Bushehr, with work scheduled to begin in 1974. Iran
received further assistance from the west during the mid 1970s when the Nuclear
Technology center at Isfahan
was founded with French assistance in training the personnel that would be
operating the reactors being built at Bushehr. The progress of the Shah’s
nuclear program came to an explosive halt in February of 1979 when the militant
Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini toppled the Shah’s government and work
at Bushehr ceased. At this late point in the development, reactor one was
already 90% complete and 60% of the equipment installed, while the second
reactor was approximately 50% complete. The new post-revolutionary government
of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan decided that Iran did not need nuclear energy
and nuclear progress was halted. However the nuclear program that Ayatollah
Khomeini inherited was by far one of the most ambitious programs in the Middle East.[1]
The
policies of the Shah made him very unpopular. Not only did he represent a
highly westernized influence in his home country, but his tendency to flaunt
his wealth offended the poor of Iran.
Furthermore the atrocious human rights violations of the Shah certainly did not
go unnoticed by the Iranian public as he attempted to quash the clergy led
revolution of 1979. The SAVAK (Sazeman-I Ettelaat va Amniyat-I Keshvar) was the
main tactical unit designed to eliminate threats to the Shah after the CIA coup of Prime Minister Mossaadeq. The SAVAK
grew increasingly brutal as time progressed and by the time the 1979 revolution
was underway, SAVAK was engaged in torture, executions and other egregious
breeches of human rights law. When
Khomeini took control of Iran
as the supreme leader, a role that is both religious and political in nature, he
wanted little to do with the westernized notion of nuclear power and he too
rejected the current nuclear program. Given the instability of the region,
Kraftwerk refused to resume work in the Bushehr plant in 1982, and all through Iran filed a case with the ICC (International
Commerce Commission, not Criminal Court) for breech of contract, it would seem
that the nuclear program in Iran
would be terminated completely.
However the Iran-Iraq war of 1984
served as a reminder to Iran’s
leaders of the merits of having an active nuclear program. The ruthless boarder
conflict waged on for 8 years with victims estimated over one million, both
civilian and military. The Iran-Iraq war finally ended with a ceasefire
agreement in 1988 and it is asserted that intentions related to the
imperialistic war are still present today. In a letter by Ayatollah Khomeini to one of
his senior commanders in 1988 (and made public in September 2006) only a year
before his death in 1989 Khomeini stated that “Iran
may need a nuclear bomb to win the war against Iraq.” Although it is important not
to take this as Khomeini’s implicit approval of the development of nuclear
weaponry, the statement highlights his consideration of a militarized nuclear
program in Iran.
There has been a lot of speculation about the militarization of the nuclear
program during the Khomeini regime, however you will find it difficult to find
any conclusive proof of IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - one of the
principle military sects of Iran) officers working in a state effort to develop
a nuclear bomb, so be weary of sources that support this claim.
Unsuccessfully
searching the west for someone to resume work on the Bushehr nuclear plant, the
Iranian leadership could not find any willing countries or private
organizations. Frustrated, Iran
raised international concern when it signed a bilateral agreement with China to build
two 300 megawatt units of Chinese design, hoping to resume progress in the
nuclear program, and all though the agreement was confirmed in 1993, the plan
was never realized. In 1994, Iran
finally found a reliable nuclear partner in the USSR and the Ministry of Atomic
Energy of the Russian Federation (MINATOM) and the AEOI finally reached an
agreement to finish the Bushehr nuclear power plant building on the
infrastructure already in place. However, building on unfamiliar foreign design
proved to be more difficult then simply starting from scratch, and due to
complications and financial difficulty, Russia has yet to complete work in
Bushehr
Unfortunately
those contributing to the nuclear program in Iran during this time were not all
legal state actors. After his arrest in 2004 the infamous Abdul Qadeer Khan
admitted to providing Iran
with stolen Dutch blueprints from his former employer FDO
(physics dynamic research industry.) Khan was charged with providing “Key
elements of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment” [2] program and in
addition was charged with the sale of a proven nuclear weapon design to Iran, North Korea as well as other
dangerous non-state actors. The Iranian regime did admit that it began uranium
enrichment in 1985 and received blueprints for a centrifuge design in 1987,
however, it has not admitted the purchase of any of the weapons designs that
Khan had for sale. Although it is important to take note of the fact that Khan
did state that he provided Iran
with designs and components related to nuclear weapons, this information is not
conclusive. The alleged illegal dealing with Khan further hurt the perceived
legitimacy of the Iranian nuclear program as it suggests that the regime was dealing
with an illegal arms smuggler and suggests that the regime was comfortable
breeching accepted international law in order to meet their goal of increasing
their nuclear power, be it on a civilian or military level.
Entering
into the new millennium, Iranian-US relations, still strained from the 1979 US hostage
crisis, were slowly improving. President Khatami, elected in 2000 was seen as a
hope for Iran
to stray away from hard line post-revolutionary ideals and move towards
moderation and greater social freedoms. Furthermore, President Bill Clinton and
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, lifted a ban on Iranian luxury goods
and the “road map” to improved US-Iran relations seemed to be well under way.
Even after the September 11th attacks of 2001 Iran
presented itself as vehemently against the Taliban and provided sincere
condolences for the innocent victims of the attacks, further strengthening
international confidence in the government of Iran.
However in his State of the Union
address in January 2002, President George W. Bush announced his infamous “Axis
of Evil,” including Iran
in this list, accusing them of pursuing weapons of terror and oppressing the
Iranian people. Iranian relations began their downward slope, although not
necessarily entirely as a result of the speech. Prior to the infamous “Axis of Evil”
speech, a seizure of a 50-ton shipment of Iranian weapons, allegedly bound for
Hezbollah forces in the Gaza Strip, infuriated the US. The later discovery of two
secret Iranian uranium centrifuge projects in development certainly did not improve
the badly damaged relations. Confirmed by satellite photographs, the 2002
discovery of Natanz and Arak
shocked the international community. The large-scale uranium enrichment plant
and large-scale heavy water plants respectively were not declared to the IAEA
and were being developed in secret. To calm the international community, Iran
agreed to IAEA inspections in December.
Although there were some initial
problems getting Iran
to commit to an IAEA inspection, an assessment was carried out in August of
2003 with the IAEA discovering highly-enriched weapons grade uranium at Natanz.
In an attempt to appease the enraged west, in 2003, Iran made a deal with
France, Britain and Germany, the so-called EU3 representing the European Union,
stating that it will suspend all enrichment related activities and later agreed
to allow snap inspections of its nuclear facilities, signing the protocol.
The years that ensued were a
continual pattern of Iran’s
promise to suspend uranium enrichment, and then resuming uranium enrichment
until the pressure from the international community was strong enough to force
the re-suspension of enrichment.
Continued pressure from the US
forced the IAEA to revisit the Iranian issue, and although Director General of
the IAEA, Mohammed ElBaradei, said that there was no proof of Iran pursuing a nuclear weapons program, he
urged Iran
to be more forthcoming and requested further information to confirm the nature
of the Iranian nuclear program. Frequent IAEA complaints of Iran’s
non-compliance characterized the year.
The 2005 election of President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad further exacerbated tense relations as he replaced a far more
moderate president, viewed by some as a step away from the post revolutionary
ideals that had characterized the country in 1979. A hard line conservative,
Ahmadinejad represented the intense fundamentalist ideals embraced by Khameini and
the fundamentalist Islamic clergy leading the country. Shortly after his
election in August of 2005 Ahmadinejad announced that Uranium enrichment would
re-open at Ifsahan and in 2006, UN seals were removed at Natanz. In February
2006, Uranium enrichment was resumed, with flagrant disregard for the concerns
of both the UN as an institution and the member states party to it. In March
2006 the IAEA sent Iran to
the SC in a vote 27-3 and Iran
officially became a matter for the Security Council to debate.
Current situation
The
international community does not take issue with Iran
pursuing a civilian nuclear program which is Iran’s inarguable right entrenched in
the NPT and affirmed by the IAEA. However, the increasingly militaristic bent
of Iran’s nuclear program
not only threatens western and surrounding countries in the Middle
East but more importantly violates non-proliferation treaty
agreements and additional protocols put forth by the IAEA which will be further
discussed in the coming sections.
In April of
2006, Iran
announced that it had officially enriched Uranium to 3.5%, suitable for reactor
fuel. In a statement after sending Iran
to the Security Council, ElBaradei stated that Iran had thus far made it
impossible for the IAEA to assure that there is no military involvement in the
nuclear program. One of the most commonly asserted concerns, largely supported
by the west, is why Iran, an oil rich country, would invest so many hundreds of
millions of dollars into uranium enrichment - especially when many western
countries offered to provide peaceful nuclear energy to Iran, asking only that
they cease their current nuclear program in return.
However, recent IAEA reports
suggest that nuclear energy is the most competitive of Iran’s fossil fuel alternatives, and could
remedy the issues Iran
has been facing given its high levels of energy consumption - which has
increased more then 7% annually in the past two decades.[3]
Although it is arguably unfair of the IAEA to urge Iran
to stop the self sufficient enrichment of uranium, their motivation, given the
secrecy and clandestine nature of Iran’s nuclear program to date, is
understandable.
Furthermore, ElBaradei stated
that the IAEA and the SC requires “Transparency that goes beyond the measures
prescribed in the safeguards agreement and additional protocol - if the Agency
is to be able to understand fully the twenty years of undeclared nuclear
activities by Iran”[4] The international
community is losing its patience with Iran, after years of attempted diplomatic
efforts have failed. Options are being exhausted and Iran itself is being further pushed
out of the favor of international circles. It now seems a legitimate reality to
see Iran join the ranks of North Korea as
a rogue nuclear state.
Past UN actions
IAEA
The
International Atomic Energy Agency was founded in 1957. The agency works
alongside the UN to encourage the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as well
as promote the safe applications of nuclear energy. The IAEA finds its
collective legitimacy from the states party to the United Nations, as well as
the signatories of the Non- Proliferation Treaty, or NPT.
NPT
The NPT is
a binding international treaty dedicated to the cessation of militarized
nuclear programs and the promotion of peaceful applications of nuclear science.
187 states (parties) have signed on the NPT since it was opened for signature
in 1968 including the five nuclear weapons states; United States, United
Kingdom, Russia China and France.
The treaty
utilizes a system called “safeguards” geared to the verification of safe state
run nuclear weapons programs. To comply with their pledges under the NPT states
must co-operate with safeguards like declarations of nuclear material, subsequent
monitoring, and verification with other outside sources that the state
declarations are accurate. Since the discovery of clandestine nuclear weapons
program being developed in Iraq in the early 90s, the IAEA has modified its
safeguards system to “provide assurance that not only is declared nuclear
material not diverted for military use, but to provide assurance that there are
no undeclared nuclear activities.”[5] This requires more
IAEA access and greater IAEA freedom to documents and Nuclear Power Plants (NPP’S)
in addition states must allow access and info about their fuel cycles, uranium
mines, nuclear waste and any other locations where nuclear material is intended
for non nuclear usage.
Other common safeguard measures
include short notice inspector access to all buildings on a nuclear site, info
on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear related technologies, and
inspection mechanisms for manufacturing and import locations, access to other
nuclear related locations, collections of environmental samples when deemed
necessary by the IAEA.
The IAEA
can also be charged to perform verifications inspections and weapons
inspections under the authority of the Security Council but rights and
responsibilities under this are unique. Thus far the inspections and
verification programs applied to the Iranian situation utilize both traditional
IAEA inspections, in inspections mandated by the SC (to be discussed in greater
detail later in the guide.) Iran
has a history of failure in meeting the IAEA requirements, most notably under
this revised protocol. Although this is well documented in the news, one of the
best sources of detailing this is through reports available on the IAEA
website, although you should familiarize yourself with as many as possible the
Resolution adopted by the board of governors of the IAEA (GOV/2003/81) serves as a good introduction.
Moreover reports by the Director General of the IAEA, available on the IAEA
website delineate many of the problems the Iran situation presents to both the
IAEA as well as the Security Council. Again you should familiarize yourselves
with as many of them as possible, but I think you will find the following three
most pertinent to your debate. NOTE* You will find the Latin expression “Inter
Alia” in many of these reports - it simply means “amongst other things.”
Board Resolution
GOV/2003/81 Implementation of the
NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran- Resolution adopted by
the Board on 26 November 2003
This report recalls the last
resolution adopted by the board, making note that the IAEA must be able to
verify the non diversion of nuclear technology. It requests that Iran sign and
ratify the additional protocol and implement it as well as suspend uranium
enrichment and other reprocessing activities. In addition there are a few
informative pre-ambulatory clauses as well as operative clauses that will be of
interest to you, take note of perambulatory clauses F, H, K, L and M as well as
operative clauses 1,7,9 and 10.
Reports by the
Director General
GOV/2006/27 Implementation of the
NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran- Report
by the Director General
This report not only serves as a
succinct update on the development and progress (or lack there of) with the
Iranian nuclear situation, but it makes mention of a few interesting items as
well. Paragraphs 4, 6, 8, 9 provide evidence to both support Iran’s efforts to appease the international
community as well as places where Iran was asked to increase efforts.
Paragraph 10 makes mention of a “foreign intermediary” many anti-Iran sources
believe this intermediary to be Q.A. Khan, the arms smuggler mentioned in the
history portion of this guide. Also this report mentions “the Green Salt
Project.” This refers to a laptop in CIA
possession that allegedly details an Iranian nuclear weapons program; however
it has yet to be provided to the IAEA for an independent analysis. As such, it
remains as speculation, and is absolutely not legitimate evidence to either
prove or disprove any Iranian nuclear aggressions. Unless there have been any
developments since the publication of this guide, it will not be acceptable
proof of aggressions in the upcoming November debate, do what you will with
that information.
GOV/2007/8 Implementation of the
NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolution
1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic
of Iran- Report by the
Director General
This report, like all Director
General Reports, gives a detailed overview of the events to date. You will find
section D- the section on outstanding issues, particularly helpful as it will
tell you precisely what still needs to be resolved. Likewise, the summary in
section G, paragraphs 26 to 29 should help clarify the problems that these
reports have been describing.
GOV/2007/22- Implementation of
the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council
Resolutions in the Islamic Republic
of Iran-Report by the
Director General
This report gives both an update
on the status of unannounced inspections and highlights that Iran has yet to engage in sustained
suspension of uranium enrichment, in paragraphs 4 and 5 respectively. The
updates on enrichment related activities show that the progress of Iran has not
been ideal; however it has made steps towards complying with the wishes of the
international community. The outstanding issues in paragraph nine are repeated
from GOV/2007/8 however, the final
point highlights that Iran
could have provided a legitimate source for the highly enriched uranium
particles found in earlier inspections, which is encouraging. However the most
significant points mentioned in this report are in sections E.2 and E.3.
Section E.2 covers code 3.1, a contentious issue in the both the international
security and academic communities as it refers to the obligation of Iran to
declare design information of new facilities, which could be condemning in
light of the discovery of Arak and Natanz, this will be discussed further in
the “case study” section. Another interesting addition in this report is paragraph
16 of section E.3. which mentions polonium experiments, relevant because
polonium can be used to initiate nuclear weapons. Lastly sections F and G will give an update
on transparency measures and a summary of the findings to date, respectively.
Security Council
Iran was sent to the Security
Council for its non-compliance on the 8th of March 2006. The Security Council
will now work along side the IAEA to resolve the Iranian issue; the choice to
put Iran
before the SC highlights the severity of the matter. Unlike the more passive
IAEA the SC is able to endorse state sanctions and raise the level of collective
coercion that the UN can assert. It is now the role of the SC to compel Iran
into a mutually agreeable decision.
Resolution 1696 - The first resolution adopted by the SC after the
IAEA sent Iran
to the committee. This resolution outlines what Iran must do to avoid sanctions-
essentially comply with IAEA safeguards and confidence measures. It also
mentions a few Director Generals Reports in the pre-ambulatory clauses you may
want to read.
Resolution 1737 - Reiterating what resolution 1696 stated on the
non-compliance of Iran, and
finding that once again Iran
has not accommodated the demands of UN resolution 1696, Resolution 1737 is the
first resolution to apply sanctions. Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations the SC can
apply measures, more specifically economic interruptions and cessation of
diplomatic relations, not including physical force of course, that can give
effect to their decisions, should the state in question not comply with their
demands. This is indeed what the SC does with Iran in this resolution, including
but not limited to encouraging states to freeze the accounts of select Iranian
businesses and nationals (detailed in annex 1 of the resolution) not
withstanding what is necessary for basic necessities, such as food, rent and
medical treatment. The SC threatens to adopt further sanctions if Iran
does not respond to the sanctions mentioned in this report and resolve
outstanding issues with the IAEA.
Resolution 1747 - As can be expected given with the necessity of
another resolution; Iran
did not satisfy SC demands within the allotted time. Resolution 1747 is by far
the most aggressive of the resolutions passed against Iran. Utilizing
words like deplore it is possible to see the level of frustration expressed by
the international community at this point. Additional sanctions are applied to
select Iranian officials, nationals and businesses and barring humanitarian
purposes, states and private financial institutions are no longer encouraged to
enter into grants and loans with the Islamic Republic of Iran. As well as
additional sanctions, Annex 1 of persons and businesses that these sanctions
(as well as sanctions contained in 1737) has grown. Once again this last
resolution closes assuring Iran that if it complies with the IAEA the sanctions
will be lifted, however if Iran decides not to comply, the SC will once again
apply additional sanctions. Bear in mind that the Islamic Republic of Iran and
its people do not have an economy that can withstand continual sanctions by the
international community, and have already been subject to countless sanctions
by the US
outside of the UN. The aforementioned sanctions will present difficulties for Iran. Annex II
includes some necessary elements of plausible long term agreement that could
prove beneficial for both Iran
and the states of the UN.
Case study
A lot of the frustrations in the
Iranian nuclear crisis concern Iran’s
refusal to implement select strengthened safeguards to build confidence and
increase transparency. A prime example
of this is the purported confusion surrounding the modified version of code 3.1,
a strengthened safeguard encouraging states to provide design information for
their nuclear facilities at a very early age of development.
The case
for Iran would suggest that Iran has no
obligation to declare construction or design of a new facility until 180 days
before the introduction of nuclear material to that facility. Therefore the constructions
of Arak and
Natanz, as well as reactors within the facilities are not breaches of NPT
obligations. This would be permissible under the 1976 version of code 3.1
The case
against Iran however, would
suggest that in the modified version of code 3.1, which Iran had
accepted in 2003 but “had not yet been ratified by parliament”[6] still holds. Iran
stated that it had temporarily suspended the implementation of the modified
code in favor of the 1976 version that was ratified, however “in accordance
with Article 39 of Iran’s safeguards Agreement, agreed subsidiary arrangements
cannot be modified unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the safeguards
agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in subsidiary
arrangements.”[7] Essentially this means
that Iran
had no right unilaterally to revert back to the 1976 version of code 3.1 and
thus the IAEA still has a right to know about the design information on the
construction of facilities and sensitive nuclear developments.
This case
study highlights the difficulty that the UN and SC face when dealing with the
Iranian issue. It frequently comes down to arguments about the authority of the
IAEA and the assumed intentions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. You may find
it difficult to get past the rhetoric in this topic, however there is generally
a concrete reference to Iran’s
ability or inability, depending on the case, to justify their actions, so try
not to get discouraged.
Proposed solutions
and questions a resolution must answer
There have
been a variety of solutions proposed thus far to resolve the Iranian nuclear
crisis. Prominent author and journalist, Alireza Jafarzadeh, proposes
supporting anti-revolutionary organizations such as the MEK to disband the
parochial government of Ahmedinejad. A less controversial approach has been
offered by Dr Mohammad Sahimi, a professor of chemical and petroleum
engineering, suggesting that we should have more faith in Iran and offer a fair trade of nuclear
technology and reactors from the west, in exchange for more transparency and
accountability from Iran.
Given that there is going to be no Iran
in your committee, it will be expected that you take care to reach a resolution
that is not only agreeable to western powers, but one that would be appealing
to Iran
as well. You could look to past resolutions from both the IAEA as well as the
SC for methods that have failed; a good resolution will encompass both western
demands for Iranian transparency as well as Iranian demands for more respect
for their nuclear program and sovereignty.
Research
Research for this topic can be
difficult for a few reasons, the first being that it highlights the huge divide
between western countries, especially the US and Middle Eastern countries, particularly
Iran. Not only is this a nuclear program but it frequently comes into question
when condemning Islamic countries in the west, and the similar condemnation of
biased American values. The only thing I can suggest in this respect is to remain
very skeptical of the sources that you employ. Secondly, there is a lot of
scientific jargon tossed around in the sources found. Although it is important
to know, for example, why it matters that Iran is enriching uranium, it will
not be expected that you explain to the committee how to enrich uranium. If you
have any questions or concerns, don’t hesitate to email me at 5vt2@queensu.ca.
Here is the list of sources
referenced in this study guide, but it is by no means exhaustive, so keep up
with your own research, especially that pertaining to your countries specific
positions.
Sources
IAEA Reports
These are PDF files, so go onto the IAEA website www.IAEA.org and use the search engine by just
typing in which report you would like to read, for example GOV/2007/8.
Security Council
Resolutions
The best way to access any resolutions you would like to
review is to go to the UN website www.un.org
select “Main Bodies” in the menu and then select “Security Council.” This will
give you all the resolutions you need as well as other resources related to the
Security Council you might want to reference.
The only book sited in this guide is Alireza Jafarzadeh’s
The Iran Threat. It is an excellent book, especially if you are looking for an
introduction to the Iranian Nuclear program, again though study it with the
same skepticism you would any other source I have recommended to you. Just
because it is in print doesn’t mean it can’t be wrong or biased!
Jafarzadeh, A. (2007). The Iran Threat. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jahanpour, Farhang. "Chronology of Iran's Nuclear
Programme." Oxford Research Group. 2007.
2007 <http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/work/middle_east/iranchronology.php>.
"Iran."
Amnesty International. 2007. Amnesty International. 2007
<http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/Iran>.
Sahimi, Mohammad. "Iran's Nuclear Program."
Payvand. 5 Sept. 2005. 15 Aug. 2007
<http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/03sahimi.html>.
OR
www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html
"Iran's
Nuclear Program: FAQs." CBC
News Indepth. 13 Mar. 2006. CBC
News. 8 July 2007
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iran/nuclearprogram.html>.
"Iran:
Current Developments and U.S Policy " Issue Brief for Congress. 9 July
2002Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress 15 July
2007 <fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/23178.pdf >.
" Secrets of History- The C.I.A. in Iran-Iran-U.S.
Relations: A Chronology." New York Times Online. 2000. NY Times Online. 15
July 2007
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-us-timeline.html
>.
"Treaty onm the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT)."UN and DIsarmament.2002.United Nations. 10 July 2007
<http://un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty >.
"Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme Sent to UN
Security Council." International Atomic Energy Agency
News Center.
8 Mar. 2006.IAEA. 8 July 2007
<http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/bog080306.html>.
"Iran."
Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book. 19 July. 2007.CIA. 8 July 2007
<http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html
>.
"Iran’s
Key Nuclear Sites." BBC News
Online. 16 Jan. 2006.British Broadcasting Corporation. 5 July 2007
<http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east4617.html
>.
"Country Profile: Iran." BBC
News Online. 07 July. 2007. British Broadcasting Corporation. 5 July 2007
<http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/countryprofile.html
>.
"Nuclear Weapons Proliferation." MSN Encarta. 2007.Microsoft Corporation. 8 July
2007 http://encarta.msn.com/text_701702692_0/Nuclear_Weapons_Proliferation.html
"Islamic Republic
of Iran." IAEA
Publications. December 2002. International Atomic Energy Agency. 10 Aug. 2007
<http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2004/CNPP_Webpage/countryprofile.html>.
"IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons." International Atomic Energy Agency Information. 2001. International
Atomic Energy Agency. 8 July 2007.
<www.IAEA.org>. Use the
Search engine on the IAEA website by typing in the title provided to bring up
this PDF file
"Iran-Iraq War.". 2007. MSN
Encarta. 8 July 2007.
http://encarta.msn.com/text7615806400/Iran-IraqWar.html
"Ministry of Security SAVAK." Global Security
Organization. 10 Aug. 2007
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/savak.html>.
"In Depth: Iran, History-‘Axis of Evil’:
1999-Present." CBC News
Online. 13 March. 2006. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 11 July 2007
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iran/history4.html>.
"In Depth: Iran, History- Reza Shah Pahlavi:
1921-1941." CBC News Online.
31 May 2006. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 15 July 2007
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iran/history2.html>.
"In Depth: Iran, History- Revolution
1979-1999." CBC News Online.
17 June 2003. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 11 July 2007
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iran/history3.html.
"Timeline: Iran’s Nuclear Program." FOX News Online. 18 June. 2004.FOX News Network. 15 July 2007
<http://www.foxnews.com/printerfriendlystory/0356612309000.html>.
"In Depth: Iran, History-‘Axis of Evil’:
1999-Present." CBC News
Online. 13 March. 2006. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 11 July 2007
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